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Sammendrag:.Samtidig som økonomer har anbefalt 
å innføre avgifter for å sette en pris på eksternaliteter, 
har det ofte vist seg politisk vanskelig å innføre slike 
avgifter. Det finnes en stor litteratur om holdninger til 
miljøavgifter. Det har imidlertid vært få forsøk på å 
sette disse i sammenheng og på å isolere effekten av 
egoistiske og sosiale preferanser. 
 
Forskningsspørsmålet i dette studiet er hvilke faktorer 
som påvirker oppslutningen om drivstoffavgiftene. Vi 
introduserer en modell for holdninger til 
drivstoffavgifter og tester denne modellen samt mer 
spesifikke hypoteser ved hjelp av data fra en 
spørreundersøkelse foretatt blant et representativt 
utvalg av den voksne norske befolkningen. 
 
Våre resultater antyder at oppslutningen om 
drivstoffavgiftene best kan predikeres basert på 
oppfatninger av miljøkonsekvensene (av avgiften), 
fulgt av oppfatninger av konsekvenser for andre 
mennesker. Opfattningen av konsekvenser for en selv 
(egeninteresse) er den faktoren som forklarer minst av 
variasjonen i oppslutningen om drivstoffavgiftene. 
 
Det faglig interessnate funnet at oppslutningen ikke 
kan forklares godt uten å fange opp et bredt spekter av 
motivasjonsfaktorer er også høyst politisk relevant. 
Funnet indikerer at det ikke finnes noe magisk 
formular for å øke oppslutningen om miljøavgifter. 
Det er imidlertid noe faktorer der er mulig å gjøre noe 
med: tilliten til hvor godt myndighetene bruker 
provenyet, og oppfatningen av at avgiften i seg selv 
ikke påvirker atferd eller gir noen miljøforbedring. 
   
Abstract: While strongly recommended by 
economists, it has often been politically difficult to 
impose taxes on externalities. There is a substantial 
literature on public attitudes towards environmental 
taxes. There have, however, been few comprehensive 
attempts to understand attitudes towards 
environmental taxes, and few attempts to isolate the 
effects of selfish and social preferences.  
The main research question in this paper is which 
factors influence support for fuel taxation. We propose 
a model of attitudes towards fuel taxation, and test this 
model as well as more specific hypotheses, using data 
from a representative survey of the adult Norwegian 
population.  
Our results suggest that support for fuel taxation is 
best predicted by beliefs about environmental 
consequences, followed by beliefs about consequences 
to others. Beliefs about consequences to self (self-
interest) is the factor that explains the least variation in 
support for fuel taxation. 
The academically interesting result that support cannot 
be well explained without capturing a broad range of 
motivational factors is also highly policy relevant. It 
implies that there is no magic formula for increasing 
public support for environmental taxes. There are, 
however, some issues which can be addressed: trust in 
how well the government spends the revenue, and the 
perception that taxation does very little to change 
behaviour and thus to reduce environmental problems.  
 
 
Språk: Engelsk Language of report: English  
 
Rapporten kan bestilles fra: 
CICERO Senter for klimaforskning 
P.B. 1129 Blindern 
0318 Oslo 
 
 
Eller lastes ned fra: 
http://www.cicero.uio.no 
 
The report may be ordered from: 
CICERO (Center for International Climate and 
Environmental Research – Oslo) 
PO Box 1129 Blindern 
0318 Oslo, NORWAY 
 
Or be downloaded from: 
http://www.cicero.uio.no 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Contents   
 
1  Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
2  Support for Pigouvian taxes: literature review ................................................................................ 1 
3  A model of support for environmental taxes ................................................................................... 3 
4  Results and discussion ..................................................................................................................... 7 
4.1  DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS ............................................................................................................................... 7 
4.2  ESTIMATING THE MODEL ........................................................................................................................... 8 
5  Concluding remarks ...................................................................................................................... 12 
6  References ..................................................................................................................................... 14 
7  Appendix: The questionnaire ........................................................................................................ 16 
 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks to Erik Griffin and Niklas Röhr at Synovate for help with designing and running the survey. 
Thanks to Johannes Emmerling, Torgeir Ericson, Torben Mideksa, Silje Tørnblad and Hege Westskog 
for valuable comments. The project was funded by the Research Council of Norway. 
 
 
 
CICERO Working Paper 2010:01  
 Public accept for environmental taxes: self-interest, environmental and distributional concerns 
 
1 
 
1 Introduction 
Two things in life are supposedly certain: death and taxes. It might be certain that there will be taxes, 
but it is far from certain what will be taxed – and how much. While strongly recommended by 
economists, it has proven politically difficult to impose efficient Pigouvian taxes (i.e. taxes on 
externalities) because of opposition from both industry and the public. There are many examples of 
failed Pigouvian tax initiatives, such as the French carbon tax in 2010, road pricing in Edinburgh in 
2005, a tax on fossil fuels in Switzerland in 2000, the fuel tax escalator in the UK in 1999, or the tax 
on energy in the US in 1993, to name just a few examples. Opposition to Pigouvian taxation comes 
from both businesses and the public. The main motivation for this study is to better understand the 
factors that influence public support for Pigouvian taxation, and what can be done to make Pigouvian 
taxes more feasible.1  
In this paper we present a model of public support for Pigouvian taxes, provide testable hypotheses, 
and use survey data to assess these hypotheses. We proceed with a review of the literature in section 1. 
We introduce the model and our hypotheses in section 2. We describe the survey and analyze the 
results in section 3. Finally, we give our concluding remarks in section 4. 
 
2 Support for Pigouvian taxes: literature review 
It is not straightforward to define what constitutes a “feasible” tax. It is simple only in the relatively 
rare situations when binding public referenda are held on the introduction of new taxes, although this 
was the case with the Swiss referendum on fossil fuel taxes in 2000 (Thalmann, 2004). In 
representative democracies, a politically feasible tax is a tax that generates enough votes in the 
parliament, congress or senate. In practice it is often difficult to describe exactly what is necessary for 
a tax proposal to be politically feasible. Businesses and special interest groups clearly have a strong 
influence. There are many theories that can explain the political opposition to taxes imposed on 
industries, among them public choice theories on rent seeking and special interest groups. These 
theories suggest that small interest groups with much at stake will be most effective in influencing 
government policy (Olson, 1965). 
While the household opposition to a tax proposal might typically be less well organized and funded 
than that of industries, households hold significant political power because they vote. Gaunt and his 
co-authors (2007) argue that for road user charging “commentators now acknowledge that the greatest 
impediment to implementation is public … acceptability”. This supports the argument that at least for 
taxes levied directly on individuals, public support is essential to make a tax feasible. King et al. 
(2007) does not agree fully, and argues that “the idea that a policy cannot be approved in the absence 
of popular support is at odds with the way policies are actually advanced.” Although the “political 
calculus” of environmental taxes might not be an exact science, it is still clear that it is politically risky 
to propose unpopular policies. List and Sturm (2006) find that “while lobby contributions [from 
industry] must undoubtedly be an important factor behind policy choices in many areas, it seems 
difficult to deny that politicians implement policies […] also to attract additional voters to their 
platform.” 
 
Models of support for environmental taxes 
Among the studies on the support for Pigouvian taxes, very few are based on a theoretical model. 
Most studies are either exploratory – such as focus group studies attempting to identify which factors 
matter, experiments designed to test the effect of one or a few factors in isolation, or (the largest 
                                                     
1 The terms ”support” and ”acceptability” are used interchangably in this paper. 
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group) survey analyses based on more or less ad-hoc assumptions. Three important exceptions are the 
papers by Stern et al. (1993), Rienstra et al. (1999) and Schade and Schlag (2003): 
Stern et al. (1993) provides a widely used theoretical foundation for explaining proenvironmental 
behaviour. They develop a social-psychology model where action in support of environmental quality 
can be motivated by egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric value orientations. They go on to test the 
model using survey data. While they find general support for their model, they also find that when it 
comes to the willingness to pay through taxes, only self-interested motives are a reliable predictor.  
Rienstra et al. (1999) create a conceptual framework to assess the feasibility of various transport 
policies. The framework has three main categories of factors explaining support for policy measures: 
Personal features and current mobility pattern, perception of the effectiveness of policy measures, and 
perception of mobility as an individual/social problem.  
Schade and Schlag (2003) use a “heuristic acceptability model” to identify and analyse determinants 
of the acceptability of road pricing. The model includes eight different factors: problem perception, 
aims to reach (e.g. financial, ecological), mobility related social norms (do your significant others 
think you should accept the strategy), knowledge about options, perceived effectiveness and efficiency 
of measures, personal outcome expectations, attribution of responsibility (to self or to others), and 
socio-economic factors. They find that the factors social norm, personal outcome expectation and 
perceived effectiveness are positively related with acceptability, and that these factors explain 
acceptability much better than the socio-economic variables they included.  
 
Factors influencing support for environmental taxes 
Among the papers that focus on identifying which factors influence support for taxation (rather than 
develop and test a model thereof), the results are relatively consistent. One important reason for public 
opposition to environmental taxes is that the public does not seem to understand – or trust – the main 
rationale for Pigouvian taxes. Dresner et al. (2006a) find that both the general public and business hold 
“a view of taxes solely as a means of raising revenue, rather than in terms of their incentive effects”. It 
seems that people to a large extent do not understand how a tax can increase welfare (see also 
Kallbekken et al., 2008), and furthermore that they do not believe taxes to be very effective in 
influencing behaviour. In partial contradiction to this, Kallbekken and Aasen (in press), find that most 
participants in a focus group study in Norway thought that the “main purpose of environmental taxes 
was to influence behaviour (provide incentives to substitute away from the polluting activity), rather 
than to raise revenue for the government”. The majority of studies is, however, in line with what 
Dresner and his co-authors found. Gaunt et al. (2007), analyzing the rejection of the Edinburgh road 
user charge, find that “the public were largely unconvinced that the scheme would have achieved its 
dual objectives of reducing congestion and improving public transport.” Putting it quite simply: people 
typically do not believe that the price (or tax) elasticity of the taxed good is very high. 
This result can be linked to the strong and consistent result that earmarking the revenues from 
environmental taxes for environmental purposes increases their popularity: if you do not believe that 
environmental taxes will improve the environment by altering behaviour, then earmarking the 
revenues for environmental purposes might do the trick. Another important reason for the strong 
support for earmarking might be public distrust in government. Rivlin (1989) made the general 
suggestion, that earmarking is popular because without earmarking taxpayers have no clear idea of 
what the money is spent on, and they might believe it is spent “wastefully or even fraudulently, or that 
a substantial part of it goes for a services of which they disapprove of”. The result that earmarking the 
revenues would substantially increase support seems very robust and is confirmed by Dresner et al. 
(2006b), Hsu et al. (2008), Schade and Schlag (2003), Schuitema and Steg (2008), Steg et al. (2006) 
and Thalmann (2004). 
One drawback of these studies is that while they can say how much support for a specific tax scheme 
would increase if the revenues were earmarked; they are unable to generate more generalized results or 
say much about which factors influence how much earmarking increases support. Using a choice 
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experiment design Sælen and Kallbekken (2010) estimate the gain in support produced by earmarking 
the (additional) revenues for environmental measures. Without earmarking the majority of the people 
would prefer to reduce the current tax rate by around 20 %, whereas Sælen and Kallbekken find that 
with earmarking the majority would prefer to increase the tax rate by about 20%.  
Several focus group studies find that people would generally like more information about the 
environmental taxes (e.g. Dresner et al., 2006a). While these studies come out in favour of providing 
information in order to increase support, Winslott-Hiselius et al. (2009) draw a somewhat different 
conclusion based on the experiences with the Stockholm congestion charge. They suggest that “trials, 
generally, may be a more useful tool than information in the process of implementing ‘difficult’ policy 
measures, such as congestion charges” (Winslott-Hiselius et al., 2009). 
Two issues relating to fairness have been identified as having an effect on the support for policy 
instruments: the perceived distributional fairness of the tax (see Dresner et al., 2006a; Eriksson et al., 
2006; Fujii et al., 2004), and the coerciveness of the instrument (see Baron and Jurney, 1993, 
Jakobsson et al., 2000).2 Taxes on some externalities, for instance emissions associated with energy 
intensive goods, can be regressive (e.g. Shammin and Bullard, 2009). Again the issue of how the 
revenues are used is central: Eliasson and Mattsson (2006) find that for the equity effects of the 
Stockholm congestion charge, the two most important factors are the initial travel patterns and how 
revenues are used. In addition to distributional concerns, there has been significant attention dedicated 
to the resistance to coercive policies. Baron and Jurney (1993) find that people would vote against 
policy reforms which they expected to produce net benefits if they perceived the policies to be 
coercive. They suggest that one reason why there are social norms against voting for coercive policies 
is that such policies take away choices from people. This is confirmed by for instance Jakobsson et al. 
(2000), who find that the acceptability of road pricing is “negatively affected by perceived 
infringement on freedom”. A related finding in Kallbekken and Aasen (in press) is that some focus 
group participants  “thought it would be unfair to impose a tax if there are no environmentally friendly 
alternatives, and others do not see the point of environmental taxes if they have no effect on behaviour 
(i.e. if the tax elasticity is low).” 
In addition to the factors discussed thus far, it is also possible to relate attitudes to environmental taxes 
to broader socio-economic and political variables. Income, age, sex and pro-environmental attitudes 
are among the significant factors identified by Eriksson et al. (2006), Fujii et al. (2004), Jakobsson et 
al. (2000) and Loukopoulos et al. (2005). Rienstra et al. (1999) find that that support is higher among 
older people, people with a higher education, those who do not own a car, and members of higher 
income groups.3 Analyzing survey results from a Swiss referendum on fossil fuel taxes, Thalmann 
(2004) finds that the main determinant of the vote was people’s political orientation, that people with a 
higher education voted significantly more often in favour of the tax proposals, while household 
income was not a clear-cut determinant, and gender had no effect. Furthermore, citizens living in the 
largest municipalities were more favourable towards the tax proposals, as were people with more faith 
in government regulation than in the self-regulation of markets. People who owned a car were 
markedly less favourable towards the proposals.  
3 A model of support for environmental taxes 
The existing literature provides a rich background for identifying factors which influence public 
support for fuel taxes (environmental taxes in general). The reason for conducting another survey is 
that there are important weaknesses with the existing research on this topic. The most important 
weakness is that most studies approach the issue in an ad-hoc manner, often focusing on how one or a 
few factors influence support. Stern (2000) argues that in order to understand environmentally 
significant behaviours better, we need theories or models that incorporate variables from more than 
                                                     
2 Kallbekken and Aasen (in press) find that potentially undesirable distributional effects of taxation did not seem 
to be as important for participants in a Norwegian focus group study, as it seems to have been in other studies. 
3 There is least support in the lowest income group, but no significant differences among the other groups. 
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one of the different classes of models. We agree with this claim and propose a comprehensive model 
that accounts for the influence of different types of factors on the support for fuel taxes. Based on this 
model we present clear and testable hypotheses. Furthermore, we address the literature gap identified 
by Jaensirisak (2005) – that there have been few attempts to isolate the impacts of selfish and social 
preferences – by assessing the relative impact of these different factors on support for taxation. 
The model proposed by Stern et al. (1993) provides a useful point of departure for explaining attitudes 
towards fuel taxes. There are also other relevant models of proenvironmental or prosocial behaviour 
(e.g. Ajzen, 1991, Schwartz, 1977).  Some, but not all of these models can be extended to predict 
support for environmental taxes. When it comes to addressing our research question, we need to 
account for how support for environmental measures relates to attitudes towards taxation as a policy 
instrument per se (i.e. trust in government use of revenues, substitution effects and income effects). 
We build on insights from existing (general) models and propose a specific model designed to account 
for attitudes towards both the environmental issue and towards taxation as a policy instrument. 
We propose that an individual’s level of support towards environmental taxes is influenced by four 
broad factors. The first is the individual’s perception of the consequences of the tax to herself.  The 
second factor is the individual’s perception about the environmental consequences of the tax. The third 
is the individual’s perception about the consequences of the tax to other people. Lastly, we include 
socio-political variables.  
For the purposes of this paper we further propose specific variables which can be used to represent the 
factors in the model, as shown in table 1.  
Overarching factor Specific variable 
Beliefs about consequences to self fuel consumption, daily access to car, household 
income, availability of alternative transport 
Beliefs about environmental consequences concern about environmental effects of driving, 
perceived effect of tax on emissions from cars 
Beliefs about consequences to others concern for regressive effects of the tax, perceived 
income elasticity of demand 
Socio-political variables trust in government use of revenues, gender4, 
education 
Table 1: The relationship between overarching factors and specific variables in the model 
 
We define the following general model of support for fuel taxation, where the explanatory variables 
refer to the factors listed in Table 2: Support = f(fuelconsumption, income, alternatives, env.concern, 
effectiveness, regressive, incomeelasticity, political, trust, gender, education) 
The levels of the explanatory variables are elicited through the various questions in the survey (the 
survey questions can be found in the appendix). Apart from fuel consumption and income, they are 
categorical variables. Table 2 lists the different questions together with the answer alternatives, which 
are numbered for later reference. It also states our hypothesis about which category we expect to be 
most (least) supportive of fuel taxation, notated with the sign “+” (“-“). For the continuous variables, 
signs denote the hypothesized sign of the marginal effect of an increase in this explanatory variable on 
support.  The hypotheses are numbered from H1 to H10. They are based on our model and on existing 
literature.  
                                                     
4 Gender is included as Stern (1993) find that women are more likely support pro-environmental political action, 
though the effect disappears when beliefs (values) are controlled for.  
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Label Question/Statement Alternatives  
fuelconsumption Total annual fuel consumption Continuous - H1 
income Gross annual household income Continuous + H2 
alternatives Self-reported possibilities for… 
a) …walking or bicycling instead of driving 
b) …using public transportation 
Poor- to good+ 
(1 to 5) 
 
H3 
env.concern Concern for the effects of driving… 
a) …on the climate 
b) …on local air quality 
c) …in terms of noise 
d) …in terms of congestion 
e) …in terms of accidents and injuries 
None- to high+ 
(1 to 4) 
 
H4 
effectiveness Perceived effectiveness of taxes at reducing 
car use and emissions 
None- to high+ 
(1 to 5) 
 
H5 
regressiveness Concern for the effect of fuel taxes on low-
income households 
None+ to high- 
(1 to 4) 
H6 
incomeelasticity Perception of driving as a necessity or luxury Necessity- to luxury+ 
(1 to 3) 
 
H7 
trust Trust in government use of tax revenues Low- to high+ 
(1 to 5) 
H8 
gender Gender male-, female+ H9 
education Highest level of education completed 9 yrs– to >4 yrs 
university+ 
(1 to 4) 
H10 
Table 2: Explanatory variables in the model, questions in the survey and hypotheses  
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In order to estimate the model empirically, it needs to be specified more precisely than the 
conceptual model above. For each categorical variable, k dummy variables are created, where 
k is the number of categories. These are named by combining the label and the category 
number from table 2. For each dummy-coded variable, one of the dummy variables is left out 
of the model to avoid perfect colinearity. For the attitudinal questions with four (five) 
alternatives, alternative 2 (3) is omitted. For gender, the omitted group is male. An error term 
e is included to account for the variance in support not explained by the model. The model to 
be estimated empirically hence becomes: 
Si=β1fuelconsumptioni +β2incomei +  δ1dalternatives.adi + δ2dalternatives.bdi + δ3dconcern.adi + 
δ4dconcern.bdi + δ5dconcern.cdi + δ6dconcern.ddi + δ7dconcern.edi + δ8deffectivnessdi + 
δ9dregressivnessdi + δ10dincomeelasticitydi + δ11dtrustdi + δ12femalei + δ13deducationdi +ei 
where the subscript d denotes a dummy variable from 1 to k, while the subscript i denotes the 
individual. 
The equation above is not a regression model because the level of support S  is not directly 
observable. Our observations are limited to the respondents answer to the question: “If there 
was a referendum today on what should happen to the fuel taxes, i.e. the taxes on gasoline and 
diesel, which alternative would you vote for?” For simplicity we will hereafter refer to this as 
the “referendum”. The respondents can choose between five alternatives: remove the taxes, 
decrease the taxes by NOK 1/litre, no change, increase the taxes by NOK 1/litre, and to 
double the current tax rates. We denote the outcome by yi. This variable is ordinal: the 
alternatives have a natural ordering from one to five, but the numerical values reflect only the 
ordering and have no other numerical meaning. This makes the usual linear regression 
inappropriate. Instead, we use an ordered choice model. We assume that the larger the latent 
variable S, the more likely a higher ranked alternative will be chosen.  Specifically, we 
assume respondents will make their choices based on comparing their S with certain threshold 
values, as illustrated in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The latent variable S and threshold values. 
By assuming that the error term is i.i.d. normal, we can apply the ordered probit model to 
estimate the coefficients in the equation for S, as well as the threshold values μi. This 
maximum likelihood estimation is carried out with numerical methods using the software 
Stata. 
In addition to the factors included in the model, we expect attitudes towards fuel taxation to 
be correlated with political party preferences. We therefore elicit voting intentions for 
parliamentary elections. However, we do not include this variable in the model, as the 
direction of causality is ambiguous. Attitudes to fuel taxation may have causal influence on 
voting intentions. In that case, including voting intentions in our model would introduce the 
problem of reverse causality, which is a form of endogeneity that can result in biased 
empirical estimates. Another possibility is that both attitudes to fuel taxation and political 
preferences are partly explained by some underlying attitudinal variable which is not 
observed. If so, any relationship identified between the two observed variables would to some 
extent be spurious, again resulting in biased estimates. We therefore leave political 
preferences out of the model, but we will present descriptive statistics about their relationship 
with attitudes to fuel taxation, as this may be of interest regardless of the causal nature of the 
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relationship. Our hypothesis relating to political party preferences is that Support is higher 
among people who would vote for the social democratic parties than for people who would 
vote for the conservative parties (ordered according to the traditional left-right axis in 
Norwegian politics), and lowest for people who would vote for the Progress party.  
There might still be some issues with endogenity in the estimated model. It has been 
suggested (for instance by Rienstra et al., 1999) that due to cognitive dissonance, people who 
do not want taxation, might answer that they do not believe that taxes will be very effective in 
influencing behaviour. It may also be that strong opposition to fuel taxes can cause people to 
reduce their (stated) concern for the environmental effects of driving, again to reduce 
cognitive dissonance. In other words, it is not given that the chain of causation is always in 
the direction implicit in our model. While we cannot rule out that cognitive dissonance can 
affect the direction of causality, we consider the direction implied in our model to be the most 
standard and most plausible direction of causality.  Endogeneity is a potential problem in 
general when attitudinal variables are used as predictors. This may be a part of the reason why 
several studies (including Schade and Schlag, 2000, and Jaensisirak et al., 2005) find that 
attitudinal factors explain more of the variation in acceptability than socio-economic factors 
do. 
4 Results and discussion 
In March 2010 we conducted a nationwide online survey of the adult Norwegian population. 
The survey was conducted by the survey company Synovate. 1245 people responded to the 
invitation to take part in the survey, out of which 1177 people completed the survey (we 
excluded the data from the people who began but did not complete the survey). The median 
time taken to complete the survey was 8 minutes. The response rate was 45% and the sample 
was representative of the adult Norwegian population with respect to age, gender and region. 
Before interpreting the results, it is important to know that Norway has had a tax on petrol 
since 1933 and on diesel since 1991. The purpose of these taxes is to make users face the 
external costs related to accidents, congestion, noise, road wear and emissions with negative 
health and environmental impacts (Ministry of Finance, 2010). In addition, there is a CO2 tax 
on both petrol and diesel. In 2010 the total tax rate was NOK 5.40-5.44/litre for petrol and 
4.14-4.19/litre for diesel. Using NOK 5 as an approximation (this was the number used in the 
survey) this corresponds to around EUR 0.60/litre or USD 3.20/gallon. 
4.1 Descriptive results 
The most important question in the survey and the dependent variable in our analysis is the 
referendum. Table 3 shows the distribution of the answers to this question 
. 
 N Percent Cumulative Percent 
Remove the taxes (i.e. reduce the tax 
by around NOK 5 per litre) 
293 24.9 24.9 
Reduce the taxes by NOK 1 per litre 358 30.4 55.3 
No change to the tax rate 375 31.9 87.2 
Increase the taxes by NOK 1 per litre 97 8.2 95.4 
Double the fuel taxes (i.e. increase the 
taxes by around NOK 5 per litre) 
54 4.6 100.0 
 Total 1177 100.0  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the referendum on the fuel tax rate. 
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The results clearly show that the majority of the respondents (55.3%) would want to reduce 
the fuel taxes. Only 12.8 % would like to increase the current fuel tax rates. Note that the 
question does not say anything about how the revenues would be used if the tax is increased - 
or how the drop in revenues would be compensated if the tax is decreased. As mentioned 
earlier, the effect on acceptability of how the revenues are used is the main topic in the paper 
by Sælen and Kallbekken (2010). In this paper the research question is how individual 
attributes such as car ownership, income and attitudes influence acceptability. 
4.2 Estimating the model 
We first ran an ordered probit model including all the variables from the equation on page 6. 
This estimation failed to identify a significant effect at the 5% level for some of the 
hypotheses presented in table 2. We first discuss these variables, before we present the results 
of a reduced model where these are left out. The most surprising non-effect is perhaps that the 
availability of alternative means of transportation does not have significant predictive power. 
The regression also fails to identify any significant influence of several categories of concern 
for the environmental consequences of driving. In fact it is only the concern for climate 
change that seems to have any significant effect. This is partly because correlations between 
concern for the different effects of driving make it difficult to isolate the effects of each. If the 
variables measuring concern for the climatic consequences are omitted, some of the dummy 
variables relating to concern for local pollution effects become significant. Nevertheless, the 
result contrasts with the Ministry of Finance’s stated motivation for the fuel tax (estimated 
external effects). The CO2-tax only makes up 14-16 percent of the total tax rate on fuels.  
Education is highly correlated with income, and its coefficients are not significant when 
income is also included. 
The rest of the variables are included in a reduced model, the results of which are given in 
Table 4. The number of observations used in this estimation is 1080, as 97 respondents did 
not disclose their income. The standard measure for the goodness of fit for ordered probit 
model is the likelihood-ratio index, also known as McFadden’s pseudo R2, which is given by 
1 െ LLሺܾሻLLሺ0ሻ 
where LL(b) is the is the log likelihood functions value at the estimated parameters, and 
LL(0) its value when all parameters are set equal to zero. The model obtains a value of .22, 
which is reasonably high for this type of model. The coefficients can be interpreted as the 
marginal effects on the latent variable Support. Although the absolute level of this variable 
has no interpretation, it is nevertheless useful to compare the relative sizes of the coefficients 
and their signs. The coefficients for fuel consumption measures the marginal effect on 
Support of an increase in fuel consumption of 100 litres, and the corresponding unit change 
for income is NOK1000. For the dummy coded variables, the change is from 0 to 1, i.e. the 
marginal effect on Support of being in a given category relative to the reference group (the 
omitted category). Marginal effects relating to the observed dependent variable – the 
alternative chosen in the referendum – can be calculated in the form of marginal effects on the 
probability of choosing each of the five alternatives. For the sake of brevity, these are not 
reported here. Intuitively it is clear that a positive coefficient translates into a positive 
marginal effect on the probability of selecting one of the higher alternatives. As a point of 
reference we note that a high degree of environmental concern means a 13% increase in the 
probability of supporting a tax rise, relative to the reference group (some concern).5 
 
                                                     
5 Based on a simple probit where the dependent variable is collapsed to increased tax versus non-
increased tax. 
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Variable Coef. Std. Err. p-value 
fuelconsumption -0.0064 0.0024 0.009 
income 0.0004 0.0002 0.048 
env.concern.a1 -0.3602 0.0983 0.000 
env.concern.a3 0.3564 0.0883 0.000 
env.concern.a4 0.6220 0.1132 0.000 
effectiveness1 -0.5339 0.1299 0.000 
effectiveness2 -0.1929 0.1207 0.110 
effectiveness4 0.2886 0.1234 0.019 
effectiveness5 1.0285 0.1780 0.000 
regressivness1 0.0580 0.1868 0.756 
regressivness2 0.4679 0.1580 0.003 
regressivness4 -0.0881 0.1090 0.419 
regressivness5 -0.5631 0.1111 0.000 
incomeelasticity1 -0.2950 0.0797 0.000 
incomeelasticity3 0.6455 0.3434 0.060 
trust1 -0.5109 0.1260 0.000 
trust2 -0.1217 0.1001 0.224 
trust4 0.3504 0.0998 0.000 
trust5 0.5802 0.1800 0.001 
female -0.2256 0.0712 0.002 
Table 4: Estimated coefficients, standard errors and p-values for the reduced model 
 
The table of coefficients reveal several interesting findings. We first note that the variables in 
the group consequences to self (fuel consumption, car access, income, alternatives) have little 
predictive power for Support. Although the coefficients for income and fuelconsumption are 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level, their magnitude is small. To yield a 
difference in support comparable to the marginal effects of the dummy variables, the change 
in income would have to be in the order of magnitude of NOK 1 000 000, while the 
equivalent figure for fuelconsumption is 10 000 litres. Furthermore, as we have seen, the 
variables relating to the availability of alternative modes of transport were dropped because of 
lack of significant coefficients. 
The coefficients for the different groups of concern about the climatic effects of driving are 
all highly significant, have the expected signs and relative sizes, and their absolute 
magnitudes are large compared to other variables. The same applies to the categories of the 
perceived effectiveness of fuel taxes at lowering emissions, except that the coefficient for one 
of the intermediate groups is not quite significant. One may combine these observations to 
conclude that the extent to which people perceive fuel taxes to have an effect on the climate 
has considerable predictive power for Support. The variables constituting the group Perceived 
consequences to others can also explain some of the variance in Support. Starting with the 
coefficients for the regressiveness dummies, we see that the signs and the ordering is as 
hypothesized: Support decreases as the concern for the regressive effect of the tax increases. 
However, only two of the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, 
which means that the relationship is not very robust. Moving on to the perceived income 
elasticity of demand, we note that perceiving car use as ‘a necessity for most people’ has a 
significant negative effect on support, compared with the reference group who thought car use 
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was best described as ‘a useful good but no necessity’. The coefficient for group 3 – who 
perceived car use as a luxury, is positive and quite large in magnitude. This effect is, 
however, marginally not significant at the 5% level due to the low frequency for this 
alternative – only 15 respondents chose this alternative. 
The Socio-political variables add further predictive power to the model. The variable - trust in 
government - appears to be one of the most important predictors of Support, with Support 
increasing monotonically with increases in trust. The coefficients are relatively large, and 
significantly different from the reference group, except for one of the intermediate levels of 
trust. The most surprising effect obtained in the regression is perhaps the negative and 
significant coefficient for female, which is the opposite of the effect we had hypothesised. 
The difference between the two genders is not very large or even unambiguous when cross 
tabulating gender with answers in the Referendum (see table 5). Hence the effect of gender 
primarily arises when controlling for the other factors included in the regression.  We would 
not draw strong conclusions from this result. 
  
% within Female % within Male 
Remove the taxes (i.e. reduce the tax by 
around NOK 5 per litre) 
24.5 25.3 
Reduce the taxes by NOK 1 per litre 33.3 27.5 
No change to the tax rate 28.0 35.7 
Increase the taxes by NOK 1 per litre 7.9 8.6 
Double the fuel taxes (i.e. increase the 
taxes by around NOK 5 per litre) 
6.3 2.9 
Table 5: Contingency table for gender and Support. 
 
The relationship between political party preference and Support, which was omitted from the 
model for reasons discussed above, is presented in the cross tabulation in table 6. To test for 
associations between the two variables, we apply a series of Chi-square tests. For each cell in 
row i and column j, we create a 2X2 contingency table where one dimension has the 
categories Row i and Not row i, and the other dimension has the categories Column j and Not 
column j. We test the null hypothesis that the two variables Row i – Not row i and Column j – 
Not column j are independent by comparing the expected contingency table when this 
hypothesis is true with the observed contingency table. We apply a standard Pearson’s chi-
square test statistic.  The cells for which the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% confidence 
level are marked, with where there is a positive association and where there is a negative 
association. Two political parties stand out as significantly different from the rest. On one 
side of the political spectrum, Progress party voters are least supportive of fuel taxes, while at 
the other side the Socialist Left party voters are most supportive. The Conservative party trails 
the Progress party in opposition, while Labour party voters display a fairly high degree of 
support. All of these results are as expected given the manifestos of these parties. There is a 
positive association between the group Other and the highest category of support. A plausible 
explanation for this is that most likely a large share of the supporters of the Green Party and 
the (left-wing party) Red can be found in this group. 
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If there was a parliamentary election today, which party would you vote for? 
  Total FrP H KrF V SP AP SV 
Other 
party 
Don’t 
know 
No. of 
interviews 1177 161 271 43 54 51 254 100 36 207 
Remove  
taxes 25 % 61% 20 % 14 % 7 % 10 % 15 % 4 % 25 % 36 %
Reduce by 
NOK 1 30 % 29 % 40% 40 % 28 % 39 % 27 % 8 % 17 % 33 % 
No change 32 % 9 % 35 % 28 % 43 % 37 % 43 % 45% 17 % 26 % 
Increase 
by 
NOK1 8 % 1 % 3 % 7 % 15 % 8 % 13 % 29% 17 % 3 %
Double 
 taxes 5 %  3 % 12 % 7 % 6 % 3 % 14% 25% 2 % 
Table 6 : Contingency table for political party preference and Support (column percentages, 
Chi-square tests with 1 % confidence intervals) 
The regression model suggests that the overarching factor that best predicts Support is Beliefs 
about environmental consequences, while Beliefs about consequences to self is the factor that 
explains the least variation in Support. To pursue this lead, we create four different regression 
models, one for each of the overarching factors, with all the variables in table 2 included in 
one and only one model. We can compare the models’ goodness of fit using the likelihood 
ratio indexes. The results are reported in table 7. Note here that pseudo-R2 does not have the 
same intuitive interpretation as R2 from an ordinary least square regression. Nevertheless, 
when comparing two models estimated on the same data so that they have the same LL(0), it 
is usually valid to say that the model with the highest log likelihood ratio fits the data better 
(Train, 2003) 
 
Explanatory factor included Likelihood ratio index (pseudo-R2) 
Beliefs about consequences to self  0.05
Beliefs about environmental consequences 0.17
Beliefs about consequences to others 0.10
Socio-political variables 0.08
Table 7: Likelihood ratio index for the four overarching factors 
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These results corroborate the observations based on the main model.  This study therefore 
suggests that the standard economic model of self-interested behaviour is not well-suited for 
explaining voting intentions on the issue of fuel taxation.6 It is Beliefs about environmental 
consequences, followed by Beliefs about consequences to others, that provide the most 
explanatory power. Our results thus suggest that people’s voting intentions are more closely 
linked to environmental and altruistic motivations than they are to selfish motivations. This 
contradicts the findings from several other studies. Stern et al. (1993), for example, find that 
only self-interested motives are a reliable predictor of support, whereas we find (narrowly 
defined) self-interested motives to be the least reliable predictor. This could be an indication 
that attitudes towards taxation differ significantly between the USA (where Stern et al. 
conducted their survey) and Norway. However, it is also interesting to note some results that 
partially contradict the findings from the focus group study which this survey was partially 
based on (Kallbekken and Aasen, in press). The variable “availability of alternative transport” 
was included because this seemed to increase the level of support for environmental policy 
instruments in general. This variable did, however, not have significant predictive power in 
our model. Finally, while they found that “undesirable distributional effects of the taxes do 
not seem to have been as important for the Norwegian participants, as it seems to have been 
in other studies”, the estimated coefficients in our model partially contradict this result too.  
5 Concluding remarks 
Fuel taxes are not popular. Our survey results suggest that the majority of the Norwegian 
population would like to decrease the current fuel tax rates by 20 % or more. This is not a 
very surprising finding. What is more surprising are the main motivations behind this fuel tax 
opposition: the economist view that voting intentions can best be explained by self-interest 
performs rather poorly when in comes to explaining voting intentions in our survey. We find 
that support is best predicted by beliefs about environmental consequences, followed by 
beliefs about consequences to others. 
If the objective is to increase voter support for fuel taxation, it is important to ensure that 
people understand and believe that fuel taxes will have positive environmental consequences. 
More specifically this would mean (1) to communicate the relationship between driving and 
climate change and (2) to communicate the effectiveness of taxes in influencing emissions 
from cars. Regarding the first causal link, education and information about the science of 
climate change may yield positive results in terms of support, as there appears to be a wide 
gap between scientists’ and the  public’s perception of climate change. Yet, it is a challenging 
task to communicate the scientific consensus to the public due to, among other reasons, 
differences in values and beliefs that affect the perceived credibility of the information 
received (see e.g. Kahan et al., 2010). Relating to the second causal link, while it might be 
true that people typically underestimate the effect of Pigouvian taxes on the taxed activity, it 
is first of all not certain that they would be very impressed by knowing the true effectiveness 
(fuel tax elasticities are typically -0.1 to -0.3), and second, it is not certain they would trust 
this information. It seems, however, that experience with taxes – as opposed to publicly 
provided information – can be effective in changing the public view of Pigouvian taxes 
(Winslott-Hiselius et al., 2009; Cherry et al., in press). Finally, it seems likely that support for 
fuel taxes could be increased by alleviating concerns about negative distributional impacts. 
This could potentially be done though transfers to low income households (as done in the case 
of the carbon tax in British Columbia), or by having regionally differentiated which are higher 
in cities. This is because support is higher if driving is not perceived as a necessity, and there 
are fewer alternative means of transportation in rural than in areas. 
                                                     
6 This result depends on a narrow interpretation of what constitutes self-interest. There could be self-
interested motivations for caring about both environmental conseqences and consequences to others. 
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In our survey the standard economic model of self-interested behaviour is not well-suited for 
explaining voting intentions. It is instead Beliefs about environmental consequences 
(primarily those related to climate change) that provides the most explanatory power. Beliefs 
about consequences to others, and socio-political variables also have greater explanatory 
power than beliefs about consequences to self. Our results thus indicate that there is much to 
gain from taking a broader approach to explaining attitudes towards environmental taxes by 
accounting for a wide range of motivational factors. 
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7 Appendix: The questionnaire 
This is a translation of the original Norwegian questionnaire. Some meaning is lost in 
translation. We have chosen a relatively direct (almost word by word) translation, but with 
further information or key words in square brackets where this direct translation could be 
misunderstood. We have preserved the original order of the questions, but some questions, 
which were not intended for nor used in this study, are omitted.  
 
Q: If there was a referendum today on what should happen to the fuel taxes, i.e. the taxes on 
gasoline and diesel, which alternative would you vote for?  
Alternatives: Remove the taxes (i.e. reduce the tax by around NOK 5 per litre); Reduce the 
taxes by NOK 1 per litre; No change to the tax rate; Increase the taxes by NOK 1 per litre; 
Double the fuel taxes (i.e. increase the taxes by around NOK 5 per litre). 
Q: To what extent do you agree with the following statements:  
 Increased fuel taxes will result in less [car] driving and lower emissions in Norway 
 It is unfortunate if increased fuel taxes harm [negatively affect] people with low 
incomes. 
 I will be dependent on driving [my car] in everyday life no matter how much better 
public transport becomes. 
 The government makes reasonable use of the income [revenue] from taxes and fees. 
 Where I live, there are good opportunities for using public transport to get to work, 
school, shops and leisure activities. 
 Where I live, there are good opportunities for walking or cycling to work, school, 
shops and leisure activities. 
Alternatives: Agree completely; Agree somewhat; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree 
somewhat; Disagree completely. 
Q: Which of the following statements best represents your view? 
Alternatives: Driving [a car] is a necessity for most people in Norway; Driving is a useful 
good, but not a necessity for most people in Norway; Driving is a luxury good for most people 
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in Norway. 
Q: To what extent are you concerned about the following consequences of car driving? 
 That driving results in congestion on the roads 
 That driving contributes to human made [anthropogenic]  climate change 
 That driving results in accidents injuring people 
 That driving contributes to noise problems 
 That driving contributes to local pollution which results in health problems 
Alternatives: Very concerned; Somewhat concerned; A little concerned; Not concerned. 
Q: What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Alternatives: Secondary school; High school [sixth form college]; University or college up to 
four years; University or college more than four years. 
Q: What was the total income of your household before tax? 
Alternatives; Less than NOK 100,000; NOK 100-199,000; NOK 200-299,000; NOK 300-
399,000; NOK 400-499,000; NOK 500-599,000; NOK 600-799,000; NOK 800-999,000; 
More than NOK 1 million; I do not wish to answer this question; I do not know. 
Q: How many people aged 18 or more are there in your household (including yourself)? 
Alternatives: 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; More than 10. 
Q: How many people under the age of 18 are there in your household? 
Alternatives: 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; More than 10. 
Q: If there was an election for the Storting [parliament] today, which party would you vote 
for? 
Alternatives: FrP (progress party); H (Conservative party), KrF (Christian democratic 
party), V (Liberal party), SP (Centre party), Ap (Labour party), SV (Socialist left party), 
Other party; I do not know. 
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Q: Does your household have daily access to a car? 
Alternatives: Yes; No. 
Q10 [Conditional on the previous question] In total, how many kilometres do you drive with 
the cars in your household and for which you pay for the fuel yourself (you might know this if 
you think about how many kilometres your cars are insured to drive per year)? 
Alternatives: open ended. 
Q: [Conditional on the previous question] What is the fuel consumption in litres per 10 
kilometres [the standard measures for fuel economy in Norway] for the car your household 
uses the most? 
Alternatives: Less than 0.5 litres per 10 kilometres; Between 0.5 and 0.75 litres per 10 
kilometres; Between 0.75 and 1 litres per 10 kilometres; More than 1 litre per 10 kilometres; I 
do not know.  
 
In addition to the questions asked in this questionnaire, we have information from the 
Synovate web panel about the respondents’ age and location (big city, small city, village, or 
countryside). At the end of the survey the respondents had the opportunity to leave comments. 
 
 
